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PETER SMITH RING 
INTRODUCTION 
In July.of 1975 the Attorney General of the State of 
Alaska announced his intention to end plea bargaining by 
assistant district attorneys in all criminal cases involving 
violations of state law. While the major thrust of this 
policy change was intended to halt negotiations over sentences~ 
the policy also dealt -- albeit less intensely -- with charge 
bargaining. 
This paper describes efforts of the Department of Law's 
Criminal Division to enhance the effectiveness of plea· 
bargaining policy through the development of uniform, state-
wide charging guidelines. While that effort is still mid-· 
stream, and data analysis is just beginning, observations of 
the activities associated with the development of the guide-
lines suggest that current notions of prosecutorial decision-
making do not fully explain the exercise of discretion in 
environments in which direct plea_ negotiations between opposing 
counsel does not occur. (I have defined plea bargaining 
thusly because Bert Miller of the Institute of Criminal Law 
and Procedure, Georgetown University, has persuaded me that 
the existence of significant unexplained sentence differentials 
between those pleading guilty and those exercising their 
constitutional ~ight to trial, even in jurisdictions such as 
Alaska which have abolished the formal practice, provides 
evidence of a more covert form of plea bargaining, if not plea 
coercion.) 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
Alaska is a land of great extremes, both in geography 
and in climate. In turn, they have had enormous influence 
on patterns of human settlement. Even today they continue to 
affect the lifestyle of Alaskans. 
The land· area of the state is vast. Alaska covers 
586,000 square miles -- one fifth the area of the entire 
United States. There are 33,000 miles of coastline -- twice 
that of the continental United States. Four time zones 
separate residents. 
Nearly twenty-five percent of the state is above the 
Arctic Circle. Permafrost traps two-thirds of the state in 
perpetual ice. In the panhandle area of southeastern Alaska 
200 inches of yearly precipitation is not uncommon. In 
contrast, the arctic reaches of the state receive less than 
six inches, on the average, and would be considered desert 
but for the permafrost. 
Across the entire state there are slightly over 7,000 
miles of highways. Only 2,200 miles or so are paved. Virtually 
all of these connect Anchorage with communities within a 
400 mile radius. Juneau, the state capital, is accessible 
only by boat or plane. 
Scattered across this incredible land mass are slightly 
over 400,000 inhabitants. That is approximately one-third 
more than resided in the state in 1970. According to recent 
census figures, only Nevada grew in population faster than 
Alaska during· the seventies. Almost one-half these people 
live in Anchorage. Only fifteen communities have more than 
2,500 residents. 
High rates of migration, both in and out of the state, 
make accurate demographic surveying virtually impossible. 
Those who can be found at census time report incomes which 
indicate that· much of the population is economically well-off. 
The state's birth rate is among the nation's highest; its 
death rate among the lowest. As might be expected, because of 
weather conditions, few elderly persons remain in the state. 
According to 1970 census data, those over 65 accounted for a 
mere 2.4 percent of the population. 
In sum, Alaska, on its surface, presents a natural and 
demographic environment unlike that to be found anywhere else 
in the "Lower 48." 
THE INTRASTRUCTURE 
Alaska was the 49th state to enter the Union, doing so 
in 1959. Late to play the game of statehood, it enjoyed the 
benefit of looking at how some things had been done with a 
view towards avoiding some of the pitfalls of the past. The 
framers produced an infrastructure for justice administration 
which is relatively unique among the several states. 
The hallmark of Alaska's justice system is the extremely 
high degree of centralization of services at·the state level. 
By constitutional and legislative mandate the state enjoys 
a unified court system which precludes the creation of municipal 
courts. Public defender services are unified and state 
supported. Correctional services, with but a few exceptions 
in rural Alaska (where the state contracts with local commun-
ities for detention facilities), are state run. Of prosecu-
torial services I shall have more to say momentarily. 
Police protection and other law enforcement activities 
in Alaska are more familiar. 'l'he Division of State Troopers, 
part of the Department of Public Safety, has state-wide juris-
diction and is, in fact, the only law enforcement agency 
serving many Alaskans. In addition, there exist some 35-40 
local police departments ranging in size from one-man to 
approximately 325 persons (in Anchorage). There are, however, 
no sheriff departments and functional jurisdictional over-
laps are rare (Anchorage -provides a major exception as the 
State Troopers still police in some areas within the political 
boundaries of the muncipality). 
Prosecutorial services, my area of inquiry, reflect the 
general pattern: centralized and state administrered. The 
attorney general, an appointed official, heads the Department 
of Law. One of his two deputies heads the Criminal Division 
and is the state's chief prosecutor (although he rarely goes 
to court). Generally mirroring the administrative regionali-
zation of the court system, prosecution is carried on by six 
district attorneys. All are appointed by the attorney general, 
at his discretion, as are their assistants. 
In Anchorage (where the Municipal Penal Code, in one 
fashion or another, virtually blankets state misdemeanor law, 
a phenomenon growing out of the state's no plea bargaining 
policy) , and to a far lesser extent in Fairbanks and Juneau, 
city ordinance offenses are prosecuted by city attorneys. 
Finally, this brief discussion of the justice system 
would not be complete without making passing reference to 
th~ fact that Alaskans have greater access to prepaid legal 
systems than any other group of working Americans. The 
Teamster's -- the state's largest union (representing not 
only truckers but also school principals (Fairbanks) and 
police officers (Anchorage)) -- plan covers all criminal 
offenses for employees and their families. Thus, unlike many 
other areas of the country, the middle class, as well as the 
rich and the poor, can afford legal representation. And 
they use those services freely. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
One of the principal departments of Alaska's state govern-
ment, the Department of Law, whose principal executive officer 
1 
is the attorney general, has among its duties the prosecution 
2 
"of all cases involving violations of state law, II 
1 
AS 44.23.010. 
2 
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While, on its face, the statute just cited would seem to 
mandate the prosecution of all cases, common sense dictates a 
contrary conclusion; and, indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court 
has recognized that: 
Under the common law, an attorney general is 
empowered to bring any action which he thinks 
necessary to protect the public interest, and he 
possesses the corollary power to make any disposi-
tion of .the state's litigation which he thinks 
best (citation omitted). This discretionary control 
over the legal business of the state, both civil 
and criminal, includes the initiation, prosecution 
and disposition of cases (citation omitted) .3 
The Attorney General has delegated his discretionary 
prosecutorial powers to local district attorneys through the 
off ice of the Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal 
4 
Division -- the state's chief prosecutor. The fact that the 
Attorney General and his authorized designees have discretionary 
powers with respect to the initiation of criminal prosecution 
does not mean that such discretion is absolute. Alaska's prose-
cutors, as is the case with their colleagues in other jurisdic-
tions, are limited in the exercise of theirdiscretion by 
A.B.A.'s Code of Professional Responsibility which has been 
5 
adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court. 
3 
4 
5 
Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d. 947, 950 
(Alaska, 1975). 
AS 47.17.010 and 020 authorize such action. 
Ethical Consideration 7-13 states: The responsibility of 
a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo-
cate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. 
This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor 
Prosecution of violations of state laws is implemented 
through attorneys and support staff based in six regional 
district attorney offices located in Ketchikan, Juneau, Kenai, 
Nome, Fairbanks and Anchorage, with resident sub-offices 
located in Kodiak and Bethel. Centralized supervision, planning,. 
policy implementation, administrative direction and the general 
furnishing of' legal services to other components of the Alaska 
criminal justice system are based in the Deputy Attorney 
General's office in Juneau. The Criminal Division employs 
approximately 80 individuals statewide, including 50 attorneys. 
represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint 
in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such 
as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) ·during 
trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he 
also may make decisions normally made by an individual 
client, and those affecting the public interest should 
be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal 
justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all 
reasonable doubts. With respect to evidence and witnesses, 
the prosecutor has responsibilities different from those 
of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should 
make timely disclosure to the defense of available 
evidence, known to him, that tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or 
reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not 
intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because 
he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid 
the accused. 
Discretionary Rule 7-103 states: Performing ~he Duty of 
Public Prosecutor or Other Government Lawyer. (A) A 
public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not 
1nstitute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when 
he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not 
supported by probable cause. (B) A public prosecutor 
or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall 
make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or 
to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence 
of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government 
lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accus~d, 
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the 
punishment. 
THE ANCHORAGE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
The Anchorage district attorney's office, serving the 
state's Third Judicial District, is the largest of the six 
D.A. offices, measured in terms of staff and case load. Over 
one-half of the statewide total of criminal filings, both 
felony and misdemeanor, takes place within the courts of the 
Third Judicial District. In addition to serving the immediate 
Anchorage area, attorneys assig.ned to the Anchorage office 
also serve the communities of Palmer (45 miles to the northeast), 
Glennallen (175 miles to the northeast), Cordova (200 air miles 
to the south) and Valdez (150 air miles to the south) , travelling 
to the latter two of these communities by air as demand and 
6 
weather permits. 
The Anchorage office is headed by Joseph D. Balfe, a 
career prosecutor. The office is staffed by attorneys 
(including women), an investigator, three legal assistants 
(law clerks who are awaiting news on bar examination results) 
and 17 support staff. 
Average tenure with the office is approximately three 
and one-hal£ years. Attorneys usually begin their careers 
with the office by handling misdemeanors and, as they gain 
experience and vacancies arise, they nmove up" to dealing with 
6 
Kenai and Kodiak and their neighboring communities, such as, 
Seward, Homer, Soldotna, Cold Bay and the Aleutian Chain 
are also encompassed within the Third Judic~al District. 
However, their case load requirements warrant full-time 
staff. 
felonies. Am9ng current incumbents, felony attorneys have an 
average of five years of tenure in comparison with the one and 
one-half years experienced by misdemeanor attorneys. 
THE PLEA BARGAINING POLICY 
Our study of charge policy development takes place against 
the backdrop of one of the more significant criminal justice 
policy experiments of the seventies. On July 3, 1975, the 
incumbent attorney general, Avrum Gross, issued a memorandum 
on plea bargaining to all district attorneys. That memorandum 
was followed up by another, dated July 24, 1975, which was 
addressed to all district attorneys and assistant district 
attorneys. On July 7 he informed the judiciary of his policy 
by memo. (All three memos will be found in Appendix A. They 
should be read with the view that the policy was evolving in 
its definition.) 
The salient points of the Attorney General's initial 
policy were: (1) that sentence bargaining was to cease, (2) 
that sentence recommendations were to be limited, (3) that 
charges should be carefully screened and filed consonant with 
a level of proof permitted by the evidence but that negotiations 
over multiple charges or charge level were permissible so long 
as their objectives were not pleas of guilty, and (4) that 
the district attorney's office, not law enforcement officials, 
was responsible for a final determination of who would be 
charged and for what offenses. 
Plans were made almost immediately to evaluate whether the 
policy was being carried out by assistant district attorneys 
and what effects, if any, the policy might have on the justice system 
in Alaska. By early 1976, funds had been obtained and the 
evaluation had commenced under the auspices of the Alaska 
Judicial Council. 
In June 'of 1976, after the annual D.A.'s conference, 
General Gross issued a third memo on plea bargaining (see 
Appendix A for the complete memo) calling for a tightening up 
on "initial charging itself. Charges [were to] be dismissed 
or decreased only under unusual circumstances, only then when 
justified by the facts in a case, and not as a quid pro quo 
for the entry of a plea of guilty." (emphasis in original) 
In May of 1977, the Judicial Council issued its first 
7 
set of public findings and concluded that "a significant 
majority of respondents agreed that sentence bargaining has 
8 
been virtually eliminated." As to whether charge bargaining 
had been eliminated, more ambiguity existed among the key 
actors within the system. Among other interim findings the 
report noted that trials increased at the District Court level 
(misdemeanors) as well as in the Superior Courts (felonies), 
disposition time decreased and that police officers were 
reporting tighter screening standards. 
7 
8 
"Interim Report on the Elimination of Plea Bargaining," 
Alaska Judicial Council, May 1977. 
Id., at vi (emphasis in original). 
The Judicial Council has just released a draft of its 
9 
Final Report. to members of the Evaluation Project's Advisory 
Board. A verbatim summary of those findings follows: 
9 
1. The policy against sentence recommendations 
was well-enforced, a finding confirmed by both 
data and interviews. Cessation of sentence nego-
tiations and termination of prosecutorial sentence 
recommendations were two of the most notable effects 
of the policy. 
2. Plea bargaining as an institution is now 
defunct ·in Alaska, according to most defense 
attorneys, judges, and prosecutors. Most attorneys 
prepare most cases with the expectation of trial, 
although most defendants convicted were convicted 
by plea of guilty. 
3. The policy was associated with an increase in 
sentence length and a lower probability of receiving 
probation for fraud, drug, and "low-risk" property 
felonies. Combining our interview data with our 
statistical findings, we conclude that the policy 
was most strictly enforced in "routinett cases. It 
was far less likely to make any difference in the 
handling--c;y-non-"routine," more serious, or violent 
cases. In general, implementation of the policy 
tended to follow paths of least resistance. 
4. "Morals" felonies (Lewd and Lascivious Acts, 
Statutory Rape, etc.), singled out by the attorney 
general as possible "exceptions" to his policy 
formed the bulk of the exceptions actually granted 
and recorded. Further, though 7 of these cases 
were tried in Year One, none were tried in Year 
Two, indicating that most cases of this type were 
treated formally or informally as exceptions to 
the policy. 
5. Trials increased significantly (by 37%) as 
expected, and the likelihood of conviction at 
trial increased from 62% to 74%. The actual 
numerical increase in trials was only 40 cases, 
which apparently did not affect the courts signif-
icantly. It did increase individual prosecutors' 
workloads, especially in Fairbanks. 
6. The new policy did not increase court dispo-
sition times; it did not even impede a significant 
See also, Ruben.stein and White, "Plea Bargaining: Can Alaska 
--Live Without It?" Judicature, 62:266-279, Dec/Jan 1979, 
and Anderson, David C., "You Can't Cop a Plea in Alaska Any 
More," Police, January 1979, p. 4. 
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decline in disposition times that had begun well 
before the policy was announced. -
7. The percentage of cases filed by police but 
rejected by prosecutors (i.e., the "screening" 
rate) increased very little in Anchorage, but 
doubled in Fairbanks and rose from 9% to 14% in 
Juneau. Screening appeared uneven: some types 
of cases that had hardly been screened at all in 
Year One were rejected in large numbers in Year 
Two (e.g., "morals" cases, Anchorage -- 6.5% 
rejected in Year One, 40.9% rejected in Year Two; 
drug felonies, Juneau -- 5.4% rejected in Year 
One, 25.9% rejected ih Year Two. 
80 Charging patterns and court disposition 
patterns (i.eo, dismissals, guilty pleas, and 
pleas to reduced charges) changed very little from 
Year One to Year Two. The causes for the lack 
of change probably include: 
a) the fact that the attorney general did 
not closely monitor charging practices or establish 
any uniform guidelines or criteria; 
b) confusion created by the attorney general 
in his memoranda and verbal instructions about 
permissible and impermissible charging practices; 
c) the futility (as perceived by defense 
attorneys) of a trial in most "routine" cases (about 
65% of cases); 
d) the inherent "realities" of prosecution 
including such things as suppression of evidence, 
misleading police reports, discovery of new evidence, 
disappearance of witnesses, and so forth -- all of 
which may create weaknesses in a case not evident 
at the time of its initial filing. 
9. The policy's implementation varied greatly 
in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau. Fairbanks 
prosecutors appeared to interpret it most strictly 
and Juneau prosecutors most flexibly. Anchorage 
prosecutors appeared more individualistic in 
applying the policy's strictures to the cases they 
handled. The variations are confirmed by statis-
tical differences in screening, court disposition, 
and sentencing patterns as well as by interviews.10 
Draft Summary: The Effect of the Official Prohibitiop of 
Plea Bargaining on the Disposition of Felony Cases in 
Alaska Criminal Courts. Alaska Judicial Council, 
December, 1978, p. i. (emphasis in original) 
The conclusions summarized in points 7-9 became apparent 
to Department of Law officials during the course of the evalua-
tion and from analysis of their own limited management data. 
Their analysis of the data available to them indicated that~ 
(1) too many cases ·were still being rejected after initial 
charging decisions had been made, (2) that too many cases were 
still resulting in acquittals, (3) that too many cases were 
still being reduced in charge after initial filings, and 
(4) that the situation was slightly more severe in the case 
11 
of misdemeanor offenses than for felonies. 
What the Department had no way of knowing with any degree 
of certainty was the extent to which the plea bargaining policy 
was actually affecting charging decisions. That is,. were these 
too high numbers lower than previous year experiences and would 
they continue to decline. Because of the comprehensive nature 
of the Judicial Council Study a decision was made not to conduct 
a separate analysis of charging decisions prior to and after 
the announcement of the policy change. The Department would 
await the findings of the Judicial Council's study originally 
anticipated for release in March of 1978. 
When it became apparent that a final report of the plea 
bargaining study would be delayed well beyond the March 1978 
target date, the Department decided to move ahead with efforts 
to tighten-up screening. This objective had been mentioned in 
the State's Annual Criminal Justice Plan for 1977 and had been 
11 
See Appendix B for data on 1976-78:dispositions in felony 
cases. 
one of the final objectives of the State's Standards and 
Goals Project. 
The Judicial Council contemporaneously had been pushing 
the Department to commence a program of greater reliance on 
the preliminary hearing as a means of initiating felony prose-
cutions. And, the law enforcement community continued to 
express interest in the concepts associated with the police 
legal advisor programs which had developed across the country 
in the late sixties and early seventies. 
The Judicial Council, interested in the screening issue 
because it was one aspect of the plea bargaining study for 
which inadequate funding had prevented a more intensive 
investigation, submitted a proposal to the Criminal Justice 
Planning Agency (Alaska's S.P.A.) in September of 1977 to 
undertake a screening study. It called for an analysis of 
screening but did not address the actual development of 
charging policy. The Council also proposed to assist in the 
development of a PROMIS type system for the Department by 
identifying critical data elements. 
Taken somewhat unawares by the proposal, the Department 
of Law's reaction was essentially negative and the proposal 
was withdrawn by the Council from further consideration at 
C.J.P.A. In part, the Department's negative reponse was due 
to the fact that it had been engaged in the initial develop-
ment stages of a funding proposal to deal with charging policy 
development, working with faculty of the Criminal Justice 
Center at the University of Alaska, Anchorage. 
The action by the Judicial Council caused the Department 
to intensify its planning efforts and to bring staff of the 
Council in on those deliberations. The final product of this 
three-agency planning consortium was a proposal (Project 
Prosecutor -- PROsecutor's Enhanced ~harging Using Tested 
Options and ~esearch) which called for the development of 
charging guidelines, experimentation with the use of the 
preliminary hearing, establishment of a police legal advisor 
position within the Department and development of a pre-trial 
diversion project. The proposal was considered and approved 
by the Governor's Commission on the Administration of 
Justice in January of 1978. Implementation efforts began in 
early March. 
PROJECT PROSECUTOR 
The formulation and promulgation of statewide crime 
charging guidelines has not been attempted in most states, 
apparently, because the offices of public prosecutors in other 
states are located within counties or other political sub-
divisions rather than being a part of the state government. 
Consequently, attempts to formulate and promulgate such uniform 
crime charging guidelines encounter resistance from each of the 
separate political entities. In addition, the organization 
most likely to undertake such an effort, a statewide associa-
tion of prosecutors, usually has no authority to require 
compliance or to insure that any guidelines would be adopted. 
California provides a notable exception. There the California 
District Attorneys' Association adopted uniform crime charging 
standards as early as December of 1974 in a first of its kind 
effort. 
The organizational framework within which prosecution takes-
place in Alaska made the development of statewide charging 
guidelines both possible and desirable. On the other hand, the 
diversity of the state's social landscape presented many of 
the problems which undoubtedly inhibited development of gbide-
lines in other jurisdictions. From the outset, the Department 
concluded that the project had to be undertaken by practicing 
attorneys if the final product was to have credibility. 
Anchorage was selected as the site for the project because it 
had the staff to support the effort and the caseload to permit 
the kinds of analysis of case variables which would be required 
to develop relevant charging guidelines. 
Prior to the initiation of PROSECUTOR intake functions 
had been performed by a single, rotating attorney in the 
Anchorage office. If the intake attorney was not in the office 
(he might be taking a case to the Grand Jury) when a police 
officer.came in for a complaint, any attorney who was available 
would perform the intake function. And, many felony cases 
first came to the attention of the off ice at district court 
arraignment, the complaints having been prepared and filed 
by police officers without assistance from or the approval of 
an assistant district attorney. 
Selection of the intake attorneys for Project PROSECUTOR 
was designed to provide a range of experience and perspectives. 
A senior male felony attorney who had had previous intake 
experience and a junior female felony attorney with no prior 
intake experience were chosen for phase one of the project. 
They determined that they would approach their task by 
rotating responsibilities on a week by week basis. One attorney 
would remain in the off ice handling intake while the other would 
take cases either to preliminary hearing or the Grand Jury 
as required. Specific days of the week were set aside for 
each of these activities. And, as a result of meetings with 
law enforcement agencies, agreements were reached that would 
require approval of the intake off ice before felony complaints 
could be filed in court. 
Beyond that, no formal steps were taken to systematize 
the process of establishing charging guidelines. The intake 
officers determined that they would "feel" their way towards 
the development of the guidelines, attempting to develop 
consistency in their respective approaches while remaining 
flexible in dealing with individual cases. They shared a 
common off ice and if both were present when a police officer 
requested a complaint they would both deal with the matter. 
In early December, after eight full months of working in 
this mode of operation, the intake attorneys embarked on a one 
week retreat of sorts. During that period they began to 
translate their experiences into words. They had, all along, 
been exploring their problem on an intellectual level, reading 
Miller (1969), Davis (1976), Abrams (1972), the California 
District Attorney's Manual, the U.S. Attorney's Manual and 
other works of a similar nature. 
Working within an outline which included topics, such 
as: ( 1) the prosecutor's role; (2) general criteria for 
screening including relevant and irrelevant factors; (3) charge 
selection criteria; and (4) evidence sufficiency and specific 
crime related criteria, they fleshed out a first draft of 
charging guidelines. After much debate, they agreed that the 
key elements of the guidelines were to be found in balancing 
the prosecutor's obligation to protect the factually and 
legally innocent against what they determined to be the five 
basic purposes of prosecution: "(l) rehabilitation of the 
offender into a noncriminal member of society, (2) protection 
of society from individuals who pose a danger, (3) deterrence 
of the offender from posing a danger in the future, (4) 
deterrence of other individuals who might pose a similar danger 
in the future, and (5) reaffirmation of societal norms through 
12 
community condemnation of the offender." They were now 
ready to turn intake over to another team of attorneys -- two 
of whom had felony trial experience and a third with just mis-
demeanor trial experience -- who would seek to work within 
the strictures of the guidelines. 
The second stage of development of the charging standards 
is now underway, having commenced on February 1, 1979. The 
12 
Tentative Draft, Alaska Charging Manual, p. 9. 
new intake officers are working within the guidelines established 
by their predecessors and are also dealing with misdemeanor 
cases. For each charge decision they make they are recording 
their reasoDS on a precoded instrument. It is anticipated that 
this data will be collected for a six month period at the end 
of which a final set of charging guidelines will be recommended. 
Prior to that, however, the tentative criteria will also be 
experimented with in other office contexts, one rural and one 
urban. Problems with the guidelines experienced in these 
environments will be factored into the final decision-making 
process so that the guidelines truly can be used on a state-
wide basis. 
TENTATIVE FINDINGS 
My observations of the process of developing charging 
guidelines to this point suggest that there are a number of 
areas related to prosecutorial discretion which need more 
intensive exploration. 
First, an annotated bibliography on the subject of 
13 
prosecutorial discretion published in 1975 by the National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service contains a mere forty-five 
references and thereby provides stark evidence of the extent 
to which one of the most potentially intrusive functions of 
government in a democratic society has been subjected to the 
13 
"Prosecutorial Discretion: The Decision to Charge. An 
Annotated Bibliography," NILECJ, L.E.A.A., Washington, 
D.C., 1975. 
potentially harsh light of scholarly inquiry. Few of those 
works (Cole [1968], Miller [1969], are among notable exceptions) 
entailed the kind of systemmatic study which would permit 
those unfamiliar with the process of prosecutorial decision-
making to begin to comprehend how discretion was exercised. 
The situation is beginning to change. In the last three 
years a number of books treating the problems of the criminal 
justice system have focused on the role of the prosecutor 
{Rossett and Cressey [1976], Buckle and Buckle [1977], Weinreb 
[1977], for example) but too frequently they have dealt only 
with plea bargaining and issues related to it. 
Most interesting, virtually all of the investigation 
to date has been undertaken by lawyers and the process of inves-
tigation has proceeded from within a framework that is 
essentially legalistic. The literature search undertaken in 
connection with this paper reveals three truly notable 
exceptions: Cole (1968), Greenwood et al. (1976) and 
Jacoby (1977). 
During the course of the case study, it has become 
increasingly clear to me that those who had previously plowed 
the fields of prosecutorial decision-making have done so on 
the basis of a number of unwritten assumptions. Few investi-
gators seem to have challenged basic assumptions about how 
the justice system ought to function. No one seems to have 
explored whether, if different models of the system were 
developed, different conclusions on d~cision-making might 
be reached. 
Thus, it seems critical that we begin to try to establish 
some relationships between alternate models of the justice 
system and the manner in which prosecutorial discretion is 
exercised. 
Initiali'y, we need to' explore more fully Davis' (1976) 
questioning of the extent to which individual discretion is 
essential to the functioning of a prosecutor's office. My 
own tentative conclusion is that such individual discretion 
may be useful at the trial stage, but otherwise is essentially 
counterproductive to both a just and effective disposition of 
criminal charges. 
Secondly, we need to explore more fully available models 
of the criminal justice system. Packer (1968) is perceived by 
many to have established the polar boundaries of models of the 
justice system. Griffins (1971),.however, takes issue with 
Packer's delineations and suggests that other models of the 
justice system can be constructed. Further, Griffins argues 
that Packer's two models, the due process and crime control 
models, are in fact a mere reflection of one model of the 
system, the adversarial model. Griffins suggests that it is 
possible to construct what he would call the family model of 
justice. Similarly, we need to look more closely at bargain 
models of justice as posited by Tossett and Cressey (1976) 
and Buckle and Buckle (1977). Finally, Weinreb's (1977) 
magisterial model offers some unique points of departure for 
further study. 
Having more fully considered some of the models of the 
justice system, we also must look at models of decision-making 
developed for other disciplines. Allison (1971) describes 
three ways of looking at decision-making which he calls: 
(1) the rati~nal actor, ('2) the organizational process, and 
(3) the bureaucratic politics models of decision-making. 
Rovner-Pieczenick (1978) has broken important ground in applying 
Allison's models to justice system research. Levin (1977) and 
Radford (1975) describe other models against which prosecu-
torial decision-making must be reviewed. We absolutely need 
to explore the extent to which these and other models can 
contribute to a better understanding of how and why decisions 
are made by public prosecutors. 
Further, we need better typologies of prosecutorial policy. 
Jacoby (1977) describes four policy types: (1) legal suf-
ficiency; (2) system efficiency; (3) defender rehabilitation; 
and (4) trial sufficiency, all of which have relevance to 
an adversarial model of justice, but bear little on a family 
model. We need to develop other models of policy-making 
if we are to increase our understanding of how prosecutorial 
discretion is exercised. 
My suggestions on the need for more conceptualizing and 
model building in the area of prosecutorial discretion are 
occasioned by actions taken by the intake officers in Project 
Prosecutor. The key elements and basic purposes of the guide-
lines cited previously are difficult to relate to typical 
notions of an adversarial model of justice administration. 
They do not fall neatly within either a due process or a crime 
control theory of justice administration. While other sections 
of the guidelines are relevant to the adversarial process, 
their application is dependent upon a decision to involve that 
process. Those sections of the guidelines which deal with 
the primary decision of whether to prosecute or with diversion 
decisions quite clearly entail notions more akin to Griffith's 
family model of justice than to Packer's theories. 
In addition to these kinds of issues, my interviews with 
and observations of the actions of the intake officers suggest 
the need for expanding our notions of factors which are 
relevant to charging decisions. The identity of the police 
officer seeking a complaint and the intake officer's knowledge 
of that officer's past loom large in the decision-making 
equation. Surprising or not, it is a factor not frequently 
discussed in the literature. In light of the developing 
knowledge of the extent to which truly small numbers of 
officers within a police department make disproportionately 
large numbers of arrests (of both the good and the bad variety), 
this factor may be rationally explained. It is an aspect 
of the decision-making process which we are exploring more 
closely in the data gathering efforts of the second stage of 
the project. 
While the environment within which the development of 
charging guidelines is taking place here in Alaska does not 
permit it, I have seen enough to suggest that we need to look 
more intensely at experience factors among intake decision-
makers. Price (1965) suggests four estates of decision-
makers -- the scholarly, the professional (in which he groups 
lawyers), the' administrati've and the political. As each has 
differing orientations, they create a check and balance system 
among decision-makers. Interestingly enough, one can fit 
prosecuting attorneys into all four of the estates and in 
some instances, I suggest, this can be done with the assistants 
within a single office. Price's work provides an interesting 
point of departure for looking more closely at types of 
prosecutors and the impact this has on charging decisions. 
Among the two assistants engaged in the initial develop-
ment of the guidelines, the more experienced attorney more 
frequently took the broader view. In one case in which he dis-
agreed with the intake decision of his younger colleague, 
cocaine possession charges (a felony offense) had been filed 
against a young man with no previous criminal history. The 
defendant had been stopped for a traffic violation. While 
producing his operator's license he dropped a small foil packet. 
The police officer asked him what it was and he replied, "Cocaine." 
He was arrested for possession. No Miranda warnings had preceeded 
the question. 
The two intake officers both agreed that there was the 
likelihood of a suppression motion on the questioning. The 
younger attorney felt that the case should be prosecuted for 
its general and specific deterrence value and as a reaffirma-
tion of societal norms. The older intake officer thought that 
diversion or deferred prosecution might be more appropriate, 
that rehabilitation of the offender was the primary objective 
of prosecution and that the goals of specific deterrence had 
likely been accomplished by the arrest and subsequent processing 
of the defendant. (As it was the younger attorney's week for 
making decisions, the young man was prosecuted.) 
Along similar lines, the older attorney, even at the 
conclusion of his initial involvement with the project, was 
still trying to resolve in his own mind the following dilemma. 
While rape cases present every prosecutor with an above average 
number of problems, in Alaska those problems are compounded by 
a series of relatively unique culturally based barriers to 
successful prosecution. A significant portion of victims are 
Native women who by western standards appear to act in a very 
passive manner. They remain so when threatened with or sub-
jected to sexual assaults. Since the state must prove that 
carnal knowledge was forcible and against the victim's will in 
order to prove rape, it must overcome a serious evidentiary 
hurdle. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that excessive 
alcohol use on the part of both the victim and her assailant is 
present in many of the factual circumstances surrounding these 
particular kinds of cases. 
The senior intake attorney described a need to prosecute 
such cases for general (and sometimes specific) deterrence 
purposes as well as to reaffirm societal norms. However, he 
also understood the high probability of ultimate non-prosecution 
by the victim or acquittal by the jury and was troubled over 
the commitment of scarce resources to such cases. His younger 
colleague was less troubled. If the evidence would support a 
conviction, the defendant would be charged. Any "problems" 
with the case would have to be dealt with as they actually 
arose. 
I will be looking for displays of similar behavior patterns 
among the new intake attorneys and if they occur will attempt 
to develop hypotheses that might better help explain the 
differences. 
Along other lines, I was interested in the dynamics of 
the relationship between the D.A.'s office and law enforcement 
agents, relationships which had been reportedly much cooler 
14 
since the onset of the no-plea bargaining policy. My own 
experiences as a member of the Plea Bargaining Study's Advisory 
Board had led me to conclude that while there was some initial, 
heated hostility to the policy by the police, as time wore on 
the heat had dissipated. There was much more agreement on the 
policy between the Department of Law representative and the 
police representative on the Advisory Board at the conclusion 
of the study than at the start. Further, at the June 1978 
annual D.A.'s meeting the policy was given a vote of confidence 
by the Alaska Chiefs of Police Association. 
14 
See Anderson, supra, n. 9 at p. 8. 
My observations of relationships-between the personnel 
of the intake office and law enforcement agents, to this point 
in time, suggest that things have returned to a fairly even 
keel and in some respects may have even improved. My guess 
is that this is a combined product of the efforts made by the 
intake attorneys to explain their decisions to the officers 
requesting complaints and 'the efforts of the attorney func-
tioning as the police legal advisor. Nevertheless, the inevit-
able tension between police and prosecutor still remains, 
largely because the police still do not completely understand 
the prosecutor's role in our system of justice. 
On this last point, the following provides an excellent 
illustration of the lack of appreciation for the prosecutor's 
role. Early on in the course of the plea bargaining study I 
engaged in a debate with police officers on the legitimacy of 
establishing the police. I asked the officers gathered if 
they saw anything wrong with their taking cases to the D.A.'s 
office and demanding that they be prosecuted. To a man, they 
viewed such actions as not only proper but also mandatory. I 
then asked them if they would see anything wrong with a D.A. 
coming over to their offices and going through the crime reports 
of the past 24 hours and demanding that they only investigate 
those reports for which he had an interest in prosecuting. 
They were dumbfounded that I would even ask such a question. 
They decided those issues. The questions helped to define the 
respective roles more clearly. They did not, however, totally 
resolve the problem. 
One inte.resting observation derived from the study, which 
may reflect practices in other communities, involved the way 
in which the intake attorneys refused prosecution without 
saying no -- a non-denial denial, to steal a phrase from the 
not too distant past. Not infrequently they would request that _ 
an officer who came seeking a complaint (especially one whose 
reputation for thoroughness was not enviable) conduct further 
investigation into some essential element of the case knowing 
full well that the officer woulq not return again to the office 
with the case. Their assumptions on how the officer would act 
were based on their experiences with follow-up investigations by 
the police in general: they were difficult to produce. 
In fact, one of the basic dilemmas confronting the intake 
attorneys was obtaining follow-up investigations in cases 
which they felt were strong enough to meet a probable cause 
test (and would not likely survive beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard) but which required further investigation. Holding 
off filing a complaint was one form of leverage by which the 
follow-up investigation might be obtained, but the risk that 
the police would not persevere was ever present. And, of 
course, their non-denial denials contributed to the confusing 
messages some officers were receiving. 
As an asidef it should be noted that one of the generally 
agreed upon benefits of the no-plea bargaining policy was better 
police case preparation, although the fact has yet to be empir-
ically demonstrated. As might be expected, the case is better 
made with investigations conducted by detectives who worked 
closely with prosecutors than with street cops. And, the fact 
that follow-up investigations were still being conducted was 
used to help persuade police officers that the no plea bargaining 
policy had not resulted in the substitution of a "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" for a "probable cause" standard in deciding 
whether to file a complaint. After all, if the former standard 
were being employed by pro·secutors, why would they need any 
further evidence to make a case? 
PRELIMINARY DATA FINDINGS 
I had hoped to report to you more detailed findings based 
on data analysis, but project slippage precluded an earlier 
start on the data collection. I am into that phase of the 
project at the moment and am collecting data along three fronts. 
First, I am looking at cases in which complaints either were 
not filed or were dismissed at District Court arraignment. I 
shall report shortly on some data obtained from that.effort. 
Second, I am collecting similar data for prosecuted cases, and, 
third, for cases which were deferred to the Pre-Trial Diversion 
component of the project. My intention is to ascertain whether 
(as there should be) there are recognizable differences among 
the three different groups of cases. (Appendix C contains a 
sample of the data collection instrument.) 
In addition to these data collection efforts, I am just 
about to begin a more systemmatic collection of data on the 
intake decision. Appendix D provides a sample of a form which 
will be used .in all cases handled by the intake office. I 
hope that the attorneys will be somewhat more rigorous in 
their recording efforts, although as an attorney my own 
experiences leads me to conclude that there will be the inevit-
able gaps. 
As I mentioned previously, I have just completed gathering 
data from a random sample ·of 110 of those cases which were not 
prosecuted. The data hasn't even been key-punched yet; conse-
quently, I can only report at the moment on a few hand-counts. 
Among the sample data, 38.2 percent of the no-charge cases 
involved situations in which an arrest had taken place. Among 
those cases, 30.9 percent involved actions taken by the Alaska 
State Troopers, 52.4 percent by the Anchorage Police Depart-
ment and 16.7 percent by other enforcement agents. Another 64 
cases, 58.2 percent, involved the refusal of the intake 6fficer 
to file a complaint where the suspect had not yet been arrested. 
Forty-eight percent of those cases (N=31) involved A.S.T. 
personnel, 34.4 percent (N=22) A.P.D. personnel and 17.2 percent 
(N=ll) other agents (see Table One and Table Two). 
Table Three provides a breakdown of self-reported reasons 
for not prosecuting the case. This data had been routinely 
collected by the Department of Law prior to the start of the 
Project, primarily for purposes of communicating charging deci-
sions to the officer who brought the case to the office. No 
statistical analysis had ever been done on the data and I 
determined that the frequency with which the forms were actually 
filled out prior to the start of the Project was so low that 
analysis of their content would not be profitable use of time 
and resources. 
TABLE THREE 
Reported Grounds for Dismissal or 
Refusal to-Charge 
Reas oh 
Defendant Assist 
State in Another 
Case 
Victim Declines 
Prosecution 
Witness Unavailable 
Inadmissible Evidence 
Insufficient Evidence 
Investigation 
Incomplete 
Referred to City 
Attorney 
Dismissed, Rule 43A 
Convicted on Another 
Felony 
Defendant Not Crimi-
nally Responsible 
Inadequate Evidence 
of Essential Element 
Other 
Unknown 
TOTAL 
*Rounding Error. 
(N=llO) 
N 
1 
14 
3 
2 
19 
5 
1 
3 
3 
3 
20 
15 
20 
110 
% 
00.9 
12.7 
02.7 
01.8 
17.3 
04.6 
00.9 
02.7 
02.7 
02.7 
18.2 
13.6 
18.2 
Cum % 
.009 
.136 
.163 
.181 
.354 
.400 
.409 
.436 
.463 
.490 
.672 
-
.808 
.990 
As is clear from the data in Table Three, the problems 
still persists. In nearly one-fifth of the cases, the intake 
attorneys were still not reporting reasons why they were 
refusing to prosecute. 
Among the reasons falling into the "Other category 
were: mutual combat, civil case, indicted on a more serious 
offense, defendant out of ·state and evidence would only 
support a misdemeanor charge, probation revocation proceedings 
instituted, restitution already made, the amount of drugs 
involved didn't warrant prosecution and, in two cases, the 
subsequent death of the defendant. 
As indicated in Table Four, the vast majority of the 
defendants or suspects were male. Table Five provides a racial 
breakdown of the group. 
Arrested 
Not Arrested 
Arrest Status 
Unknown 
TOTALS 
TABLE FOUR 
Sex of Suspects 
or Defendants 
(N=llO) 
MALE 
N 
FEMALE 
% N % 
34 40.0 5 33.3 
53 57.0 10 66.7 
3 3.0 0 0.0 
93 84.5 15 13.7 
UNKNOWN 
N % 
0 o.o 
0 0.0 
2 100.0 
2 1.8 
Race 
White 
TABLE FIVE 
Race of 
Suspects or Defendants 
(N=llO) 
N 
73 
Alaskan Native 6 
Black 14 
Other 5 
Unknown 12 
TOTALS 110 
% 
66.4 
05.5 
12.7 
04.5 
100.0 
The breakdown on the sex of the defendant/suspect is 
comparable to arrest data for Alaska. For instance, in 1978 
83 percent of those arrested were men while 17 percent were 
women. 
The racial data, on the other hand, reveals some apparent 
differences between the sample group and statewide arrest data. 
While the 1978 arrest figures for whites (63%) is comparable 
with our data, some difference exists for the Native group who 
made up 20 percent of those arrested in 1978 and blacks who 
comprised 4 percent. When the sample is separated into groups 
of those who were arrested and those who were not, and then 
broken down by race, even more striking differences occur. 
While the numbers involved are too small to provide any conclu-
sive evidence, they do suggest the need for a closer look at 
arrest practices. 
TABLE SIX 
Cases Involving 
Defendants Under Arrest 
(N=42) 
R A c E 
Agency Seeking Total White Native Black Other Unknown 
Prosecution 
N % of N % of N % of N % of N % of N % of 
Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. 
13 30.9 9 34.6 0 0 3 37.5 0 0 1 20.0 
22 52.4 13 50.9 2 100 5 62.5 1 100 1 20.0 
7 16.7 4 15.4 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 3 60.0 
42 100.0 26 100.0 2 100 1 100.0 1 100 5 100.0 
Percent of TOTAL 61.9 4.8 19.0 2.4 11.9 
TABLE SEVEN 
Cases Involving 
Suspects Who Were Not Arrested 
(N=64) 
R A c E 
Agency Seeking Total White Native Black Other Unknown 
Prosecution 
N % of N % of N % of N % of N % of N % of 
Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. 
31 48.4 24 51.l 2 .5 2 .4 2 66.7 1 .2 
22 34.4 16 34.0 2 .5 2 .4 0 o.o 2 .4 
11 17.2 7 14.9 0 o.o 1 .2 1 33.3 2 .4 
64 100.0 47 100.0 4 100.0 5 100.0 3 100.0 5 100.0 
Percent of TOTAL 73.4 6.3 7.8 4.7 7.8 
One other aspect of the project warrants brief mention. 
We have completed the collection of data on intake outcomes 
for cases opened in the months April-December, 1978. (We 
are working backwards to February.) During those months 347 
cases were accepted for felony prosecution with 161, or 46.4 
percent, being taken to preliminary hearing rather than the 
grand jury. This represents a significant increase over the 
average of approximately 10 percent of the cases taken to 
prelims in prior years. 
SUMMATION 
As I have previously stated, I had hoped to report in greater 
detail on our findings. Those of you who are interested in the 
outcome of this study should let me know and I'll be glad to keep 
you informed. 
I am confident, however, that when direct plea bargaining 
between opposing counsel does not provide the routine means for 
case disposition by prosecutors, then our current understanding 
of the meaning of prosecutorial discretion proves to be deficient. 
As the process of plea bargaining comes under increasingly greater 
scrutiny and as policy changes such as that experienced in Alaska 
are implemented in other jurisdictions, our need for a broader 
perspective on prosecutorial decision-making will increase. It 
behooves us to begin the processes of alternate model construction, 
conceptualization, theory building and hypotheses development now 
so that they will be available to those who will be analyzing 
prosecutorial decision-making in the years to come. 
APPENDIX A· 
MEMORANDUM .State of Alaska 
TO: 
FROM: 
All District Attorneys DATE: June 30, 1976 
and Assistant District Attorneys 
FILE NO: 
TELEPHONE NO: 
Avrum M. Gross SUBJECT: Plea Bargaining f- ~" ... ~ ,.... Attorney General (""': ......___ 
I·found our general discussion concerning plea 
bargaining at· the recent District Attorneys' Conference to 
be very helpful and appreciate the open expression of ideas 
and views offered by all of you. We have been operating 
under the present procedure for nearly a. year now, and while 
it has had some.unanticipated effects, the policy does not 
seem to be creating the general administrative chaos that 
some people seemed to believe would develop. 1.fuile I plan 
to continue the present policy now in effect, I think our 
discussion at the conference indicates there are a few 
things which should be stressed~ 
First of all, I want to emphasize the thrust of 
the initial sta-tement set out in my memorandum of July 3, 
1975, to all of you concerning charge bargaining. When we 
implemented the original policy, I stated that I wanted 
charges ·which were initially fiied to accurately reflect the 
level of available proof at that time and that I did not · 
want overcharging, either in terms of the number of counts· 
or the magnitude of the charge. I realize that to some 
degree it is inevitable that there may be reductions of 
charges or dismissals of charges once a defendant determines 
to enter a plea. But I think it is time to tighten up on 
initial charging itself. Some District Attorneys remarked 
to me at the conference that they were bringing multiple 
charges and multiple counts as a matter of "tactics." I do 
not want that practice to continue. I want you to file the. 
charge or charges that you think you can prove and stick 
with them until and unless you are convinced they are not 
proper charges. I reiterate that I do not want charges 
reduced or dismissed in order to obtain a plea. In essence, 
I do not want you to set up a charge bargaining situation by 
the way the initial charges are filed. Charges should be 
dismissed or decreased onl under unusual circumstances, 
only t en '·men justi ied by the racts in a case, an not 
as a quid pro guq for the entry of a plea or guilty. 
All District Attorneys 
and Assistant District Attorneys 
June 30. 1976 
- 2 
One possibility that has been recently suggested 
to me regarding the practice of charge bargaining is the use 
of some sort of a form, given to the defendant or his counsel~ 
which indicates ·that a charge is being reduced or dismissed · 
for reasons stated thereon and not in return for a plea of 
guilty to one or more offenses. The form would then state 
that the defendant is free to proceed to trial on the charge 
or charges remaining. I prefer not to have to employ this 
type of procedure since I feel that we can continue to rely · 
on a good faith effort by each of you to implement the 
policy with respect to plea bargaining that has been articulated 
here and in previous memoranda on the subje.ctc 
· I realize there are times when the elements of the 
offense may be. highly technical, as a result of which two 
similar type counts are filed to protect yourself dependent 
upon the way the evidence develops. In that instance you 
obviously only intend to seek a conviction on one or the 
other, and therefore it obviously makes sense to di$miss one 
if a plea is entered to the other count. This is not the 
situation I am trying to pr·even:t:. 
What I am trying to prevent is deliberate overcharging. 
That will not be easy to change, but I want a real effort 
made. I know that even if the facts warrant reduction on a 
charge, some of you will be hesitant to make it if you do 
not get some sort of implied or express indication from the 
defendant that he will plead guilty. After all, if the 
defendant does not want to plead, why give him the break of 
reducing ADW to A&B? The answer lies in the fact that if it: 
is the kind of case that should be reduced to an A&B, it is 
the kind of case that should be filed as· an A&B or reduced 
to one if it was initially filed at a higher level. ·I think 
over the years much of charging has become linke.d with the 
techniques of plea bargaining, to the point where filing the 
appropriate initial charge for ·an offense is not gauged in 
terms of what would be appropriate for conviction, but 
rather what would be appropriate for bargaining purposes. · 
If we are not going to bargain, that should not be a relevant 
consideration. 
All District Attorneys 
and Assistant District Attorneys 
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The second thing I want to clarify is that henceforth 
I do not want District Attorneys or Assistant District 
Attorneys participating in sentence conferences with a judge 
prior to the entry of a plea. By now, each office should 
have received a copy of the Second Circuit opinion in United -
States v. Werker. In the remote event you have not, I am 
enclosing a copy with this memo, and it should be made 
available throughout each office. If a judge persists on 
holding a pre-plea sentence conference, either at the request 
of a defense .counsel or on the judge's m·m motion~ I do not 
want the office to participate, and in fact I want the 
office to strongly protest any such conference. I think the 
practice of judicial negotiations with a defendant is an 
extremely bad one and I have made my feelings knovm on the· 
matter to both the Supreme Court and the Superior Court. We 
are presently in the process of finalizing a proposal to 
submit to the Supreme Court for an amendment to Criminal 
Rule 11 along the lines of the federal rule construed in 
Werker which would essentially prohibit trial courts from 
participating in a process of negotiating directly or indirectly 
with a defendant or his attorney with the objective of 
securing the entry of a plea of guilty. · 
Lastly, I should note th~t it has been suggested 
that certain modifications be made with respect to some 
aspe_cts of the present policy. namely that misdemeanors that 
are essentially administrative or regulatory in nature and 
fish and game violations be exempted from the policy; that-
sorne adjustment be made for prosecutions, particularly for 
misdemeanors, arising in bush corrununities; and that sentence 
recommendations be permitted more frequently and under less 
stringent guidelines. I would welcome further comment on 
these and any additional aspects of the policy from those of 
you who feel that your views have not to date beert sufficiently 
made knm·m. We are taking a hard look at proposals that 
have been made and will be meeting with certain District 
Attorneys shortly to explore possible modifications in 
depth. 
AHG:as 
Enclosure 
cc: Dan Hickey 
MEMORANDUM State of Alaska 
TO· 
FROM: 
All District Attorneys DATE: July 3, 1975 
Criminal Division 
Department of Law FILE NO: 
TELEPHONE NO: 
Avr.um M. Gross 9~~ SUBJECT: Plea Bc.rgaining Attorney General 
After·our lengthy ~nd heated discussions of last 
week on the referenced subject> I have given the matter a 
great deal of additional thought and. have discussed it with 
Dan Hickey and with the Governor. As a result o:r these 
discussions, I wish to have the following policy implemented 
with respect to all adult criminal offenses in which charges 
have been filed on and after Augus~ 15> 1975: 
(1) Commencing with offenses filed on and after 
August 15, District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys 
will refrain from engaging in plea negotiations with defen-
. dents. designed to a~rive at an agreement for entry of a plea 
of guilty in return for a particular sentence to be either 
recommended by the State or not opposed by the State pursuant 
to Criminal Rule ll(e). After the e~try of a plea of guilty, 
the prosecuting attorney under circumstances describ~d in 
No. 3 below is free to reco2send an appropriate sentenqe or 
range of sentence to the court. 
(2) While I was initially of the view that it 
would be necessary to abolish all sentence reco~,mendations 
in order to insure that some form of sentence bargaining did 
not continue to occur, reflection has persuaded me that such 
a restriction would indicate a lack of faith in the-District 
Attorneys and.Assistant District Attorneys which I never 
meant to demonstrate. Consequently, if the District Attorney 
approves a sentence recommendation in a particular case prior 
to entry of a plea (though, as noted below) this should 
not occur in the general case), the contemplated recommendation 
may be transmitted to the defendant through his attorney in 
-order that he might make up his own sind with respect to the· 
entry of a plea. Again, I stress that I do not want. bargain-
ing over sentences and.I assume that policy decision will be 
respected. 
(3) In the majority of cases, I prefer that we 
employ open sentencing bringing to the court 1.s c.ttention all 
factors relevant to a consideration of sentence rather than 
hll Dist~ict Attorneys -2- July 3) 1975 
recor.!!r:ending a particttl2.r sen-cence. Em·:ever, in light of 
our earlier discussions last ,.;eek in Anchorage, I aP.l willing 
to recognize that there are certain instances in which sneci-
fic sentence recor...mendations are approp~iate. Roughly, the 
circur:-1stanqes in which a form of sentence recor~:.l!endations will 
be appropriate are as follo~s: · 
(a) when the sentencing court s~ecifically 
:r>eq_uests the prosecuting attorney to nake a recorri_rnenda-
tion as to ~ither a sp~~ific sentence or a f6rm of 
sentence; 
(b) when there are unusual aggravating or 
mitigating.circumstances that dictate a specific recom-
mendation; 
(c) when the court has imposed a sentence which 
provides for a period of probation and recommendation 
is i~ respect to the cond~tions of probation. 
Any proposal to make a ~pecific sent~nce recom-
L.endc.tion must first be revie\':ed and approved by the District 
Attorney to det~rmine (a) whether in the particular case a 
recor:I.1"":1endation is warranted c.nd. (b) i·:hether the specif'ic sen..., 
tence proposed is consistent with sentences being imposed 
in sinilar cases in that dis~rict c.nd other districts through-
out the state. In each case where a specific sentence 
recommendation is made, a brief memo to the file should be 
prepared and endorsed by the District Attorney indicating 
· what the sentence recomrnendation '·ras, why it was felt 
appropriate and necessary and ·why it 1•;as determined to use 
specific sentencing as opposed to open sentencing. Copies 
of each such memoranduffi should be retained in a sentencing 
file maintained in each office and copies should be forwarded 
once a week to Dan· Hickey in Juneau for maintenance of a 
statewide sentencing file. 
(4) Plea negotiations with respect to multiple 
counts and the ultimate charge will continue to be permissible 
under Criminal Rule 11 as long as the charge to which a 
defend2~t enters a plea of guilty cor~ectly reflects both 
the facts and the level of proof. In other words, while there 
continues to be nothing ~rong with reducing a charge, reductions 
should not occur simply to obtain a plea of guilty. 
(5) Like any gene·ral rule, there are going to 
be so~e exceptiotis to this policy. Any deviation, however, 
must first be approved by either Dan Hickey ~r myself. In 
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cases where we are dealing ~ith co-co~spirators or cither 
similar type situations a~d a sentence bargain nay be 
required to obtain a conviction, I ~ould anticipate that we 
would approve it. In such cases I would, of course, lean 
ex~reDely heavily on the recorr~endaticn of the District 
Attorney, but permission for sentence bargains will pe given 
sparingly if at all. 
I realize that, w~ile the above policy reflects 
many of your concerns, it does not necessarily reflect all 
of' your concerns. It is possible that we-may have to t:r-y 
more cases and, if so, I will try my best to get ~dditional 
·help for us in the next legislature. I know it is.going to 
make your individual work loads somewhat more difficult, 
though I hope not much more difficult. In return for this, 
ho"pef'.ully_ we will be doing a-t·;ay with a technique which is 
generally considered> at least by a substantial segment of 
the public> as one of the least just aspects of'. the present 
justice system. It will also to a substantial degree put 
sentencing back in the courts, where I think 1~ belongs, 
instead.of' it being a product of a negotiated c..rrangem.ent. 
I have held off i~ple~enting this policy i~..meciately 
for one basic reason. Doing away with sentence bargaining 
may nean that so~e adju~t~e~ts will have to be made in·office 
orocedures in order to acco~:.r;:odate the change. An effective 
~creening of cases·filed, for example, will have to be 
instituted in order to avoid filing cases which might be 
"bargained" under the exi~ting system, but which could not 
be won at trial. We are going to have to be p:r-epared to 
move people around between offices if the trial Jogd gets 
too great in one place. It is' entirely possible that 
immediately after implementation of the policy the Public 
Defender's office or private counsel may simply balk at 
pleading anyone, with the result that we will have.a temporary 
pile-up of cases. I thirik if we make it clear that 1-le will 
do everything ·we can to hand.le that pile-up, but not back 
off the policy, the situation will be temporary and after 
awhile things should return to something like normal. 
I appreciate the fact that all of you were so 
frank with me when we discussed this in Anchorage la~t week. 
I hope nowj having had a free discussion of ou~ views, that 
we can impleme~t this policy as smoothly as possible. 
I will today inform the Public Defe~der's office 
cf the forthcoming ~edification in procedure. I anticipate 
that private criminal defense atto~neys will simply find out 
in due course . 
.C·.MG: as 
MEf\/IORAN·DUM 
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SUBJECT: Plea Bargaining 
I am sure you realize by now that what started as 
a discussion among ourselves as to new office policy has developed 
into a matter of statewide significance and national attention. 
The fact that we are going to try to end plea bargaining here 
has received comment in papers as far away as Washington, D.C~ 
and New York. The Judicial Council, the court system and this. 
office have been contacted by several national organizations · 
.who are anxious to do an in-depth study of what occurs once 
we embark. on the new ;programe 
For your reading pleasure, I am enclosing (1) an 
editorial from the "Washington Sta~'', and (2) a brief discussion 
of some of the reasons for eliminating plea bargaining as o~tlined 
by the National Advisory Cor.-h~ission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals in their study.on courts. I bring these materials 
to your attention to emphasize the significance of what you 
as District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys are 
about to do. I realize as well as any of you how difficult 
this is going to be. There are many people who believe that 
it cannot be done--that the people within the criminal justice 
system will be unable to generate the effort and dedication 
that a change.of this magn:;ttude requires. I know, for instance, 
that every member of the criminal justice system, be it District 
Attorneys~ defense counsel, or judges, is going to have to 
wo;ck harder at leqst for awhile. Trying more cases is going 
to mean greater preparation and more intense effort and that 
is asking a lot from people. 
The attorneys who work in the District Attorneys' 
offices" are professionals, and a little too old for a pep talk 
so I'll skip that approach. ·I do want to tell you, though, 
that if we can do this--if we can really make a change in the 
system to effectively eliminate sentence bargaining--the office 
will have accomplished sor.iething really.meaningful. I think 
it will be something that each person in the office will be 
proud o~. It would certainly be something the office would 
have a right to be proud c.b'out. In this· day ·when government 
is subject to so much c.ri ticism, I think it would really be 
satisfying to those who work in gover~mept to do something 
which, while difficult> is truly recognized by the public ~s 
being valuable. I hope we can do it. 
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Now, with that behind, let me make a few specific 
ccr:-;:-:.ents on procedures i.·1hich should 'be impler::er:.ted as we embark 
upon this e~periffient. The key feature of the elimination of 
p!ea bargaining is that we are going to be faced with 
~ore trials. Our problen, then, is how to han~le those trials 
\·:i th the manpm·:er we now have available. It may be that experience 
shm·:s that \·:e need more personnel,, but I want the program initially 
to operate under the assumption that \·le are going to do it 
with the people we now have. If that is the case, we are going 
to.have to develop means of keeping the trials manageable. 
Toward·that end I have two basic suggestions: 
-1. There Must Be a Careful Screening of Cases. 
A. As a basic rule) the final decision on charges 
should be made by the District Attorney who is going to 
end up having to prosecute those charges in court. In 
some judicial districts we have found ourselves in the . 
position of haying to back up or back away from decisions 
made by Public Safety officials as to. ~·rhat charge should 
be filed. I will be meeting 1·1i th Corr,_,--:is s:.oner Burton 
to make very clear that we will make that dicision in 
the future and I want each of you to make clear to the 
city or state police with whom you work that it is a prose-
cutor's function to decide what charge can be proven in 
court rather than a policeman's function. If you do that, 
you should be in a position to hold off filing those cases 
whi6h should not be filed in the first instance, and when 
cases should be filed to file them in the appropriate 
category of offense. If charges are filed by police officers~ 
and in your.opinion they are not justified, notify the 
officer> discuss it with him, but in the end promptly 
modify the charge to. what you feel is appropriate. 
B. Preliminary figures I have obtained from the 
court system indicate that the percentage of guilty pleas 
or convictions on felonies filed in some areas of the 
state is extremely low. In one judicial district it is 
less than 60 per cent. I assume that rather than·indicating 
that we are losing cases, this indicates that many cases 
are being filed 2s felonies and then being reduced to 
misdemeanors. When the percentage gets that high, it 
is indicative of the fact that the origir.21 charges are 
not appropriate. If a large percentage or cases end up 
as misdemeanors they probably should be filed that way 
in the first instance. I stress to you 5 for reasons ~ 
will mention later> that you should file the charge you 
can prove. Don't file charges which you cannot prove 
in the assumption that they will be reduced later. 
'· 
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C. Some charges should not be filed et'all. Merely 
because you are broug~t a police ~ile does not mean that 
you are required to file a crirr.~ncl c~arge. In some cases 
the facts simply will not justify crininal prosecution 
either because it is not warra~ted in the i~terest of 
justice or because technically ~e could not prove the 
charge. If.that is the.case, do not file the charge in 
the first instance. I am not interested in seeing the 
office file Assault ~ith a Deadly Weapon c~arges and then 
reduce them to simple Assaults with suspended impositions 
of sentence 1:!lth no fir.e or jail time purely because we 
never had a cas~ in the first place. The time spent on 
those kinds of cases would be better spent on the cases 
we can prove. Merely having a conviction statistic proves 
nothing--if we prosecute somebody and we believe it is 
warranted, we should be seeking a result justified by 
the offense and not simply obtaining convictions with 
meaningless penalties. 
In this vein, consider diversionary programs carefully. 
Before August 15 we \·~ill he.ve had ~eetings •·:ith Health 
and Social Services, particularly Correcticns, to try 
to outline for the various prosecutors mear-ingful alternatives 
to criminal procedures in situ~tions where criminal procedures 
are not warranted. Alcoholism rehabilitation instead 
of drunk and disorderly prosecutions is perhap.s the classic 
example', but we will try to make available. "';:;o you as broad 
a spectrum of diversionary programs as we can. If they 
are meaningful alternatives, use. them. 
D. In my initial memorandun on this subject, I stated 
that while prosecutors should feel free to reduce charges 
if facts warrant, I did not want charges reduced· 
simply to obtain guilty- pleas. I am sure 1·:ith the elir.iina-
tion of sentence bargaining there will· be a great temptation 
tc charge heavily uncer the assu~ption that you can later 
reduce the charge in exchange for a guilty plea. I do 
not \·rant the office to do that for several reasons. First, 
it would, in my opinion, violate the spirit of what we 
are trying to do) which is to insure that ~eople are charged 
fairly, tried fairly and sentenced fairly ~or offenses 
that they have committed. Second, and of c more practical 
bent, I think you will have more chance of obtaining a 
guilty plea if you ffiake the charge realis~~c in the first 
instance. Once you establish the atmosphe~e of bargaining 
with the defendant, be it over charge o~ se~tence, it 
All District Attorneys . ,, -'-1-. ·July 2 l.: . , 1975 
and 
~ssistant District Attorneys 
is difficult to stop the process. ·rr a defendant feels 
that the state has charged his properly, there is more 
of a chance of hi~ responding in a non-contentious manner. 
Again I stress, charge what y6u ca~ prove and then do 
not deviate from it unless subsequent facts convince you 
that you were erroneous in your initial conclusion. 
The third reason you should not use reduction of 
charges as a means to obtain guilty pleas is that I am 
sure you all realize you are going to be very much in 
the public eye in this experience. There are many people 
·who believe that this change cannot be accomplished, and 
they are going to look for any exm:.ple to prove tha.t. 
If you use charge bargaining to obtain guilty pleas and 
not because the facts warrant a reduction in charge, the 
office is going to be criticized justifiably for doing 
something that we s2id we would not do. I want to give 
this systen a fair try, and accordingly only reduce charges· 
when the level of proof warrants. 
!I. Ef~iciencv ~n T~ial P~ocedures. 
r.'iore effective sc::eening of cc.se s and diversionary 
prograres may help us handle some of the case load we are bound 
to face, but the major efforts should be spent at increasing 
the efficiency of the office to actually try criminal cases. 
Right now, 94 per cent of criminal cases which are filed are 
plea bargained. We can expect that number to drop substantially . 
with the result that no matter how you analyze it we are going 
to have to try a great many more cases than we are now trying. 
Presently, after the initial complaint is filed~ 
negotiations take place with defense counsel over the ·appropriateness 
cf th€ charge, continued conferences take place, and eventually 
as a result of either preliminary proceedings or continuous 
r:egotiation, some agree2er.t is reached on sentence. The time 
previously used negotiati~g with defense counsel over reaching 
a plea bargain should no~ be devoted to preparing for and trying 
cases. We will be meeting with court officials and officials 
from the Department of Public Safety and local police depart-
~ents to try and insure that we mininize the time wasted in 
bringir..g a case to trial. What we hope to accor;-.plish and \·;hat 
you should strive for is a system·bj whic~ (1) when a case 
is filed it is i~~edi~tely docketed for a trial date and an 
o~nibus heari~g and (2) u~dei the assu~ptiori that the case 
will go to tri~l, w!tr:esses should be scheduled to appea~ at 
the date set. At the o~~~bus hearir..b, cpen files should be 
t~e poli.c;y if it alree.C.y is not in the ve.ricus District Attorne~r 's 
Al: ~istrict httorneys 
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offices. While efforts sho~ld be made at the omnibus hearing 
to find out whether the defendant will enter a plea (efforts 
I'c sure that will be pro~oted by the ·judge), assune that the 
dsfendant will not plead guilty and prepare accordingly. 
. . 
If conti~uances are sought it should be the policy 
o:' the office to_ grant them E?Paringly. ThPre are, of course, 
instances in which contin~ances are inevitable, but the entire 
shift from plea bargaining is going· to require additional efficiency 
and, if that is so, efforts should be made to keep continuances 
to a minimure. If judges want to grant continuances on their 
o~n, they are of course free to ~6 so, but if we ge~ into the 
habit of consenting to continuances, we are going to run into 
so~e serious administrative proble~s when cases which are reason-
ably scheduled initially start to pile up on each other. In 
every case in ~hi~h a continuance is o~tained, of course obtain 
a Kaiver of the four-month rule. 
Since we will be having many ~ore trials, it rnay 
be desirable in rr~ulti-r..er:!.ber offices to have a clerical person 
designated ·whose sole function it is to get the right vlitnesses 
to t~e right pl~ce for the right trials on the· right dates. 
It is going to be a bit much to ask for the attorney who is 
trying the case to handle his own administrative arrangements. 
Dan Hickey will be working ~ith each office in an effort to 
icprove the handling of those administrative details so that 
the attorneys themselves are freed as much as possible for 
actual trial and preparation for trial. 
I thirik i~ you assume that every case is going to 
trial and act accordin&:;:iy, you will find that you pick up a 
lot cf time which otherwise was lost when we dealt with cases 
under the assumption they would bargain out. If .the defendant 
event~ally does"enter a plea, fine. But assume from the outset 
that he will net. 
III. r-!iscellaneous 
A. In many cases, judges or defense counsel are 
going to try to get around the policy of changing plea 
bargaining by sir:-.ply asking District Attorneys what they 
will recommend in a particular case prior to the time 
the defendant enters a plea. Except in the extre~ely 
unusual case the ans~er to this should be that no decision 
will be ~ade until the defendant enters the plea and.that 
in any event we anticipate in ~ost cases to go with open 
sentencing. If you ~ake this clear at the outset cf this 
program, it will make it lots easier for you in the future. 
•TO: 
FROM: 
• 
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Attorney General '--r · \. 
I am sure that by now you have become aware-of an 
impending policy change within the Attorney General's off'ice 
concerning plea bargaining. So as to insure that there are- . 
no misunderstandings concerning that .po"f_icy ~ I would like to 
advise you exactly what I have advised the various District 
Att·orneys throughout the state: · 
-. 
(1) Commencing with of.fenses .filed on and after 
August 15, District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys 
will refrain from engaging in plea negotiations with defen-
dants designed to arrive.at an agreement .for entry of a plea 
of guilty in return for a particular sentence to be either 
recommended by the State or not opposed by the State pursuant 
to Criminal Rule ll(e). After the entry of a plea of guilty,· 
the prosecuting attorney under circumstances described in 
.No. 3 belm·r may recommend an appropriate sentence or 
rang~ of sentence to the court. 
(2) If the District AttorJley approves a sentence 
recommendation in a particular case prior to entry o:f a plea 
(though,, as noted below, this will not occur in the general 
case), the contemplated recommendation may be transmitted to 
the defendant through his attorney in order that he might make 
up his own mind with respect to the entry of' a plea.. There· 
will be no bargaining over sentences. 
(3) In the majority of cases, the District Attorneys 
will employ open sentencing bringing to the. court ts a.ttention 
all factors relevant to a consideration of sentence.rather 
than recommending a particular sentence. There are certain 
instances in which specific sentence recommendations are appropri-
ate~ Roughly, the circumstances in which a form o.f sentence · 
recommendations will be appropriate are as follows: 
(a) when the sentencing court specifically 
requests the ·prosecuting attorney to make a recommenda-
tion as to either a specific sentence or a .forr1 of: 
sentence; 
I 
·1 
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(b) when there are unusual aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances that dictate ~ specific ?ecom-
mendation; 
(c) when the court has imposed a sentence wh~ich 
provides for a period of probation and recommendation 
is. in respect to the conditions of probation. 
If an Assistant District Attorney wants to make 
a· specific sentence recommendation, it will first be reviewed 
and approved by the District Attorney tp det~rmine (a) whether 
in the pqrticular case a recommendatlon is warraDted and (b). 
whether the specific sentence proposed is consistent with senten-
ces being imposed in similar cases in that district and other 
districts throughout t~e state •. · 
(4) Plea negotiations with respect to multiple counts 
and the ultimate charge will continue to be permissible under· 
.Criminal Rule 11 as long as the charge to which· a defendant 
enters a plea of.guilty correctiy reflects both the facts and 
the level of proof'. In other words, while.there continues 
to be nothing wrong with reducing a chargej reductions will 
not occur simply to obtain a plea of guilty. 
.· 
(5) Like any general rule; there may be some exceptions ~ 
to this policy. For instance, in cases where we are dealing 
with 60-conspirators or other similar type situations and a 
sentence bargain may be required to obtain other convictions, 
it is possible it may be approved. Approval for sentence bargains 
will b~ granted directly by the Attorney General or Deput~ 
Attorney General for. Qriminal Affairs and approval will be 
given sparingly. 
. It may be that this change in policy will result 
in more caseD bej_ng tried since defendants may be hesitant 
to plead without a specific bargain. Nonetheless i~ ~s) in - ~ 
my view at least·,, a step which is required to hope.fully restore 
some public confidence in.what is admittedly an imper.feet crim-
inal justice system. We do not yet have the kind or administra- ,.. 
tive problems in Alaska that they have in larger states,, and 
accordingly the type of experiment I am proposing is at least 
feasible. llopefully it will not result in the kind or administra-
tive problems they have in other states. 
I have advised the Public Defenders' offices o.f the 
modification in our procedures. If you have any questions 
concerning those procedures, please check w~th.the District 
Attorney in your district or directly with-this office •. We 
recognize that some initial problems may result and we stand 
ready to aid in any way possible to alleviate whatever probl~ms 
there rn~y b~. · 
AMG:as 
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As noted. in the original wemo) District Attorneys must 
approve any specific sentence recor.Jil.endation and I do 
not want specific sentence recomr;;endations made in criminal 
cases before entry of plea except in the most unusµal 
sort of case. 
An offshoot of thi~ appeared in a recent conference 
l had with the Superior Court judges in Anchorage. I 
was adYised that judges might attempt a new form of plea 
bargaining directly by calling the defendant and his attorney 
into chambers> advising him what sentence the _judge would 
give him if he pled guilty "on the basis of f'acts now 
known to the judge", and further advising him that if 
he did not plead guilty all bets were off. I was asked 
whether I would f'orbid prosecutors to participate in this 
procedure. I advised that if a judge called.a prosecutor 
to a conference he would of course attend, but that we 
would not make any recommendation for sentence prior to 
the entry of a plea. I further advised that I thought 
this would be extremely bad ~alley because (1) it would 
nake the present systeti of plea bargaining even worse, 
(2) it would legally a~ount to coercion on the part of 
a judge to obtain a guilty plea, and (3) a def~ndant who 
entered a guilty plea would very quickly apply for post-
conviction relief and my guess is would obtain it. If 
you are called to such conferences) of course feel free 
to attend but I think you should state very clearly that 
the Depc..rtment of Law disagrees with the concept of a 
judge "bargaining" impliedly or directly -v:ith a dei'endant 
and in no way participate in the meet~ng other than to 
physically attend. I told the judges that while I knew 
of their hesitancy about doing a-...·my with plea bargaini,ng!I 
I hoped they would give the system a fair try. I know 
that it will require them to try more cri~inal cases, 
and I sympathize with their concerns about that. Nonetheless 
they have a responsibility to try criminal cases if necessary 
and I have confidence that they will do whatever is necessary 
to perform that responsibility. 
After the 15th of August I will try "to spend as much 
time in the District Attorneys' offices around the state as 
I can. I will be available to listen to whatever suggestions· 
you m~y have for the improvement of the progra~. ·Do not hesitate 
to make such suggestions. At the same tireei t~e Governor is 
firmly cor.:mi t ted to this program, I ara firr:ily committed to 
it, and I hope that everyone in the department will do their 
absclute best to make a change which is, in my opinion> long 
overdue in the criminal justice system. 
Al·~G: as 
Er:clost:.res 
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APPENDIX B 
PRETRIAL FELONY CASE 
DISPOSITION DATA 
(Between Arraignment and Trial) 
Cases Disposed of Between 
Arraignment and Trial 
Percent of Total Felony 
Cases 
Dismissed 
Change of Plea to Guilty 
on Original Charge 
Change of Plea to Guilty 
on Lesser Included 
1976 
657 
73% 
234 
350 
73 
1977 
485 
63% 
157 
285 
43 
Sources: Annual Re~orts, Alaska Court System 
1976, 1977, 1978 
1978 
582 
64% 
219 
289 
74 
SUPERIOR COURTS 
DISPOSITION OF FELONIES 
1976 1977 
COMPLAINTS FILED 898 
Change of Venue 4 
Complaint Withdrawn 35 
Dismissed at Arraignment 8 
Plea of Guilty at 8 
Arraignment 
Dismissed: Pre-Trial 234 
Change of Plea: Pre-Trial .423 
Acquitted at Trial 1 
(Court) 
Acquitted at Trial 9 
(Jury) 
Convicted at Trial 6 
(Court) 
Convicted at Trial 36 
(Jury) 
Dismissed After Mis-Trial 2 
Change of Plea After 0 
Mis-Trial 
Sentenced 561 
Sources: Annual Reports, Alaska Court System 
1976, 1977, 1978 
764 
4 
5 
2 
59 
157 
328 
4 
16 
17 
86 
23 
11 
501 
1978 
905 
25 
75 
4 
53 
219 
363 
5 
39 
8 
100 
10 
4 
528 
APPENDIX C 
1. I. I ·Defendant Nurriber. 
Defendant's Narre: 
Last First M.I. 
4. I I I Date of Birth. Unknown = XX-XX-XX 
10. I I I Date of Offense. Unknown = XX=XX-XX 
16. Filing Agency (1 = AST; 2 = APD; 3 = AIP; 4 = FWP; 5 =Metro Unit 
--- 6 = Other, explain ) • 
17. Was an arrest made? (i =Yes; 2 =No). 
---
18. Total number of charges against defendant. 
---
19. _j_ I / Offense code (s) for police version of nost serious charge (s) • 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
I I / 
I I I 
---
Arrest Prorrptness: How long from time of offense to arrest? (1 = two 
hours or less; 2 = rrore than two, less than four; 3 = rrore than four, 
less than twenty-four; 4 = rrore than twenty-four hours; 5 = no arrest; 
9 = unknown)? 
Total Nurriber of Co-Defendants. 
Race of Defendant. 
---
(1 = White; 2 = Native; 3 = Black; 
; 9 = Unknown) • 4 = Other: 
-----
Sex of Defendant. (1 =Male; 2 =Female). 
Occupation at tirre of offense (1 = Professional, executive or. 
---
supervisory; 2 = Skilled worker or craftsman; 3 = White collar 
worker; 4 =Factory, unskilled worker or domestic; 5 = Student; 
6 =Other occupation; 7 =No occupation; 8 =Military; 9 =Unknown). 
Errployrnent Status at time of Offense (1 = Unerrployrnent; 2 =Military, 
---3 = Full-time job other than military; 4 = Part-tirre job; 5 = Student; 
9 = Unknown) • 
Marital Status. (1 = Single; 2 = Divorced, separated; 3 = Married; 
---4 =Widowed; 9 =Unknown). 
Was Defendant of Probation/Parole at tirre of offense? 
---(1 = Probation; 2 = Parole; 3 = No; 9 = Unknown). 
___ Does Police Report indicate a prior record? (1 =Yes; 2 =No). 
40. ___ Number of Prior Felony Arrests. (9 =Unknown). 
41. LI 
42. LI 
43. LI 
44. LI 
Number of Prior Felony Convictions. (9 =Unknown.) 
Number of Prior Misdemeanor Arrests. (9 = Unknown.) 
Number of Prior Midsdemeanor Convictions. (9 = Unknown.) 
Type of Pre-Trial Release. (1 = No release; 2 = API; 
3 = Full cash deposit; 4 = 10% cash deposit; 5 = Secured 
bond; 6 =Unsecured bond; 7 = O.R.;B=no arrest;9~unknown) 
45. LI Type of Attorney. (1 =None; 2 = Public defender; 3 = Public 
defender ·requested, disposition unknown; 4 = Private attorney; 
9 = Unknown.) 
46. LI Did Police Officer Witness Crime? (1 = Yes; 2 = No; 
·9 = Unknown. ) 
47. LI Otl1er Eyewitness to Crime? (1 = Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Unknown.) 
48. LI Did Defendant Make a Statement? (1 = Yes, 2 = No; 
9 = Unknown.) 
49. LI Did Defendant Make a Confession? (1 Yes, 2 = No; 
9 = Unknown.) 
50. LI Was a Search Warrant Used in Case? (1 =Yes; 2 =No; 
9 = Unknown. ) 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
LI 
LI 
LI 
LI 
LI 
Was t.1l:ere Identifiable Physical Evidence Connecting Defendant 
to Crime, Other Than Stolen Property (cars, fingerprints, 
weapons, hair samples, etc.)? (1 =Yes; 2 =No; 9 =Unknown; 
Describe: . ) 
Did Police Recover Identifiable Stolen Propertv? 
(1 = Identified cash-marked bills; 2 = Oth~r ~dentlfied 
property; 3 = Property not involved 1 4 =·rib; ·9 = U:nknown 
Value of Property Stolen, Damaged, Destroyed, or Taken by 
Fraud (whole dollars). (O = None; 1 = 1-100; 2 = 101~250 
3 = 251-500; · 4 = 501-1000 = 5 = 1001 - sooof 6 =5001-
10, ooo ; 7= 10,001 ·- 25,000 ; . 8 = 25,001 and above; 
9 = Unknown. ) 
Value of Property Recovered (same breakdown as 53) . 
Weapon Used. (1 = Firearm; 2 = Knife; 3 
5 = Other, explain: 
= Club; 4 = Poison; 
; 6 = Hands, feet, 
~~~~~~~~~~~-
etc. ; 7 = None; 9 = Unknown. ) 
56. LI Number of Victims. Unknm'm == 9 
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57. LI 
58. LI 
59. LI 
60. LI 
Was Primiry Victim Person or Organization? (Primary is 
most severly injured or has highest property value cost 
incurred.) ( l=person; 7=organization; 8=no victim) 
Condition of Primary Victim. (1 = Dead; 2 = Hospital; 
3 = Bleeding wound, or had to be carried from scene of 
crime; 4 = Other visible injury; 5 = No visible injury, 
but victim momentarily unconscious or complained of pain; 
7 = No personal injury; 8 = no 'victim; 9 = unknown) 
Age of Primary Victim. (1 = Under 18; 2 = 18-25; 3 = 26-55; 
4 = over .SS; 7 = Victim is organization; 8 = No victim; 
9 = Unknown . ) 
Primary Victim's Sex. (1 = Male; 2 = Female; 7 = Victim 
is organization;B~no victim; 9=unknown) 
61. LI Primary Victim's Race. (1 =Black; 2 =Native American; 
3 Caucasian or other; 7 = Victim is organization; 
8 =No victim; 9 = Unknown.) 
62. LI w·as Primary Victim Severly Handicapped? (1 = Victim had 
severe physical handicap; 2 = Victim was of low intelligence 
or had other severe mental handicap; 3 = Victim was under 
influence of drugs or liquor to extent that he was unable 
to defend self; 4 = Victim not unusually handicapped; 
7 = Victim is organization;~B-= No victim; 9 Unknown.) 
63. LI Are Primary Victim and Defendant Related? (1 Husband and 
wife; 2 = Other family relationship; 3 = Friends or 
acquaintances; 4 = No relationship; 5 = Employment relationship; 
6 = Divo~ced; a·= No ~ictim~ 9 =Unknown 
64. LI Did Primary Victim's Own Behavior Facilitate or Provoke the 
Crime? (1 =Victim's conduct evidenced some provocation; 
2 = Crime arose out of some criminal conduct on the part 
of the victim himself; 3 = Defendant claims victim provocation 
unsubstantiated; 4 = No clear relationship between victim's 
action and defendant's conduct; 8 =No victim; 9 ·=Unknown.) 
65. LI Did Defendant Make Res ti tufion to Victim? ( 1 = Yes., on own 
initiative; 2 = Yes, prior to case disposition; 3 = Yes, 
part of judgement; 4 = No; 8 = No victim; 9 = Unknown.) 
66. LL! If Drug Offense Charged, Indicate Type of Drug. 
01 Not drug offense; 07 = Has:!:"lish or syn th ethic 
02 = Opiates; cannabis; 
03 = Cocaine; 08 i'-1ari j uana; 
04 = Hallucinogens; 09 = Other, specify: 
05 = Amphetamines; 
06 = Barbituates; 99 = Unknown. 
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68. / / / / Amount of Marijuana Seized. (In grams; 28 grams = 1 
ounce.) If no marijuana enter 000, if unknown enter 
xxx. 
71. / / / / Amount of Other Drugs Seized. (Indicate number of pills, 
capsules or other dosage units seized. If none enter 
000, if unknown enter XXX.) 
74. (__/ Charge Status. 
75. L_L_I 
L_L_I 
L_LJ 
1 All charge(s) dismissed. 
2 =No charge(s) filed by D.A. 
3 =Felony charge(s) dropped. 
4 = Felony(s) dropped, prosecuted misdemeanor charge(s) 
5 =Misdemeanor charge(s) increased to felony by D.A. 
6 = Misdemeanor charge(s) dropped, prosecuted as 
misdemeanor. 
7 = Felony reduced to misdemeanor. 
Primary Reason for Not Prosecuting. 
01 Defendant pled guilty to another charge. 
02 = Defendant assisted state in prosecuting another 
defendant. 
03 Victim declines to prosecute unavailable. 
04 = Witness unavailable. 
05 Inadmissible evidence. 
06 Insufficient evidence. 
07 = Case investigation incomplete. 
08 = Referred to Municipal Attorney's office. 
09 = Interest of Justice. 
10 = Dismissed by D.A. under Rule 43a, but no reason given. 
11 = Lack of probable cause. 
12 Essential evidence suppressed. 
13 Convicted of other felony. 
14 Defendant not criminally responsible. 
15 Mistrial/hung jury. 
16 = Inadequate evidence of essential element 
17 = Prosecuted as charged. 
18 = Other, explain: 
99 Unknown. 
APPENDIX D 
CASE EVALUATION FORM 
(A Separate Forf'l Must be Prepared for Each Charge) 
(Contemolated 'or Filed Against a Defendant) 
DEFENDANT'S NAME: 
D.A. CASE NUMBER: /_/_/_/_/ / 
1 5 
INVESTIGATING AGEN~Y: 1 = A.S.~.; 2 = A.P.D.; 3 = F & W; 
4 = Other ; 5 = Private 
Citizen; 9 = Civil Division, D.O.L. I I 
6 
POLICE CASE NUMBER: I l_l_l_l_I I 
7 12 
REQUESTING OFFICER: 
DATE CHARGE(S) REQUESTED I l_l_l_l_I I 
13 18 
CHARGE REQUESTED: 
CHARGE DECISION: 1 = case rejected; 2 = charge accepted 
as requested; 3 = charge modified; 4 = case referred 
I I I I I 
19 - - 22 
I I 
TI 
to city attorney; 5 = case referred to federal authorities; 
6 = case referred to Attorney General staff; 7 = case 
referred 'to out of state agency 
8 = case referred to other state agency 
9 = further investigation required. 
CHARGE FILED: 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION REQUIRED TO: 
CASE REJECTED FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: 
CASE SYNOPSIS: 
I I I I I 
24 - - 27 
I I I 
28 29 
I I I 
30 31 
I I I TITI 
I I I 
34 35 
I I I 
36 37 
I I I 
3839 
RELATIONSHIP OF CHARGE DECISION TO REHABILITATION OF DEFENDANT: 
RELATIONSHIP OF CHARGE DECISION TO DETERRENCE OF DEFENDANT: 
RELATIONSHIP OF CHARGE DECISION TO DETERRENCE OF OTHERS: 
RELATIONSHIP OF CHARGE DECISION TO PROTECTION OF SOCIETY FROM DEFENDANT: 
RELATIONSHIP OF CHARGE TO REAFFIRMATION OF SOCIETAL NORMS: 
LEGAL PROBLEMS: 1 = Search; 2 = Arrest; 3 = Confession; 
4 = Identification; 5 = Severance; 6 = Joinder; 
7 = Speedy trial; 8 = Rule 16; 9 = None known at this 
time. 
PROOF PROBLEMS: 1 =Witness demeanor/background ~~~~~~~; 
2 = Witness availability ; 3 = Witness 
cooperation ; 4 = Physical evidence; 
~~~~~~~~-----,--.~-
= Circumstantial evidence; 7 = Corpus 5 = Hearsay evidence; 6 
delecti; 9 = None known at this time. 
LIKELY DEFENSES: l = Entrapment; 2 = Competency; 3 = Insanity; 
4 = Diminished capacity; 5 =Alibi; 6 = Self defense; 
7 = Mistake of age; 8 = Privacy right; 9 = None forseen 
at this time. 
TIME REQUIREMENTS: to Grand Jury by 
to Preliminary Hearing by 
to Omnibus Hearing by 
to Trial by 
COMMENTS TO TRIAL ATTORNEY / / 
POLICE AGENCY I I 
(check appropriate box) 
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I I 
40 
I I 
. 41 
I I 
42 
I I 
43 
I I 
44 
I I 
45 
I I 
46 
I I 
47 
I I 
48 
ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION CODES: 
01: Inadequate evidence of corpus. 
02: Inadequate evidence of wrongful intent. 
03: Insufficient proof of value. 
04: Inadequate identification~ 
05: Inadequate evidence regarding search/seizure. 
06: Corroboration of witness' story needed. 
07: Investigate alibi. 
08: Establish chain of ~hysical evidence. 
09: Obtain lab analysis. 
10: Get statement .from defenda~t. 
11: Get statement from witness. 
12: Corroborate informant tip for search warrant. 
13: Corroborate informant tip for arrest warrant. 
14: 
15: 
16: 
17: 
18: 
19: 
20: 
CASE REJECTION CODES: 
01: Prosecution will not serve to rehabilitate defendant. 
02: Prosecution will not serve to protect society rrom defendant. 
03: Prosecution will not deter defendant from further acts. 
04: Prosecution will not deter others from committing similar acts. 
05: Prosecution will not reaffirm societal norms. 
06: Prolonged non enforcement of statute. 
07: Evidence establishing corpus illegally obtained. 
08: Victim unavailable/uncooperative -- no other way to establish corpus. 
09: Non-victim witness essential to establishing corpus unavailable/ 
uncooperative. 
10: Statute of limitations bars prosecution. 
11: Lack of corroboration required by law. 
12: Inadmissible identification. 
13: Inadequate identification. 
14: Lack of credibility in victim. 
15: Lack of sufficient corroborating evidence. 
16: Charging contrary to legislative intent. 
17: Victim requests no prosecution. 
18: Immunity to be provided to defendant. 
19: Costs of prosecution too high for severity of offense. 
20: Lack of venae/jurisdiction. 
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